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Re-thinking Thought 
Francis Wybrands 
Review-essay on Critique, January-February 1985, no. 452-453: Italian Philosophers 
by Themselves (221 pages). Paris, Editions de Minuit. 
To the question raised by Eugenio Garin of knowing whether 
we must recognize the existence of an Italian philosophy-a ques-
tion of historical interest, perhaps, but philosophically of little 
relevance (would it then be legitimate to speak of a Spanish 
mathematics, a Swiss biology or a Canadian philosophy?)-it 
would be better to respond by asking instead in which ways the 
philosophical heritage which has been passed down to us since 
Parmenides is being taken up and worked on in Italy today. That is, 
how are the questions which have constituted, and still constitute, 
philosophy being reinvented in Italy today? 
(Perhaps the very notion of dividing up "the country of 
philosophy" according to geographic regions results from the fact 
that our epoch, as the epoch of communication, lives under the 
constraint of having to pass and circulate thought as "cultural 
merchandise." So if it is right to applaud this enterprise of making 
known in France what is going on at her doorstep, then it is proper 
to note that the very realization of such a project throws a merciless 
[Trans. from the French by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas] 
DIFFERENT/A 1 (Autumn 1986) 
DIFFERENT/A 250 
light not only on the miserable state of translation in France, but 
also, and most important, on the discrepancy, which has become 
more and more obvious, between thought and the means which it 
has to make itself heard. It is, perhaps, against this antipathy 
which our epoch has toward thought that the essays collected in 
this volume, better than many others, bear witness.) 
"Since the beginning of the twentieth century the general 
meaning of the world can no longer be read in the book of the 
philosophers." This statement by A. dal Lago sets the tone for a 
philosophy which no longer has illusions about itself and which 
attempts to respond to a disillusioned world by redefining the 
tasks of thinking. Thus the notion of "weak thought" -illustrated 
here by philosophers such as P.A. Rovatti, A . Gargani and espe-
cially G . Vattimo-and "sobered thought" [degrisee], a rationality 
exorcised of its own powers and inspired by thinkers such as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger (with Husserl and Gadamer) and Wittgen-
stein. 
The line of separation between being and nothingness is no 
longer stable; the solidarity between "thinking and that which is 
thought" (P. A. Rovatti), between the one who thinks and that 
which is thought, has collapsed, leaving behind a shattered unity, 
a state of crisis for "strong thought" (that which concerns itself 
only with the specular reconciliation of man and the world in the 
name of a unifying principle). It is this crisis which, beyond knowl-
edge, allows the question of meaning [question du sense] to appear in 
all its nakedness and fragility. What remains is a rupture between 
the structures of our thought-structures meant to equate the 
truth of adequate propositions to that which is-and the world, 
which, more than ever, is at the mercy of domination and, more 
than ever, finds itself sent back to its unsuspected opacity. 
To counter the common false interpretations of Heidegger-
that is, Heidegger's thought read as ontology, as the nostalgic 
return to a green, pre-Socratic paradise, as negative theology, or as 
historicism and irrationalism . .. -it is salutary to read G. Vat-
timo's text, which attempts to read the work of the thinker in its 
entirety, taking as its starting point Heidegger's most scandalous 
affirmations in order to discover in them the traces of a '' thinking of 
the decline" [pensiero del declino]. That there is nothing left of being 
means, among other things, that nihilism is "the only possible path 
for ontology ." Being is to be understood neither as a stable and 
fixed term, nor as an ultimate foundation: it "is not one of the poles 
of oscillation . . . it is the domain of the oscillation itself." Neither 
pure luminosity nor foundational force, being is inseparable from 
both its decline and its declension. Its "contingent character" is not 
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one of its attributes but its very essence. "We are beings [etants] 
only insofar as we are ventured [risques] into and through the 
venture of being" (Heidegger). Being ventures itself to us: it is only 
as this venture, this risk; and we are only insofar as we confront 
this venture. Risk, venture, putting into play-these are ways of 
expressing the contingent character of that which Heidegger 
called, in terms which are still provisional, "the ontological differ-
ence." Thus the being to which we are related by the modes of 
impermanence and mortality is both uncertain and transitory, both 
temporal and provisional. There is no shared foundation, there-
fore, but a common destiny or decline. The essential finitude of this 
play shapes, at each moment, new configurations whereby life and 
death invent themselves. Far from justifying, in the manner of the 
philosophies of history, that which is in the name of a transcendent 
principle [arche or telos ], the non-reconciling thought of Heidegger 
(similar in this way to the thought of Adorno) would arrive all at 
once at an aesthetics or an ethics, a style of life and of thought which 
can be summed up in the notion of piety. Piety is not to be under-
stood as "attention and respect," as "rememoration"-which is 
not mere recollection of that which once was, but memory of the 
uncertain traces left by the singular and unique experiences of 
man. "Not to overlook anything, not to let oneself be carried away. 
And at the same to be suspicious of immobility, of one's own 
reflection in the mirror, of the narcissistic seizure of the void" (P.A. 
Rovatti). 
In the margins of this mode of thought, R. Bodei devotes 
himself to a rigorous reading of dialectical thought-of its past, its 
present crisis, and its possible meaning. What, in fact, Bodei asks, 
could replace the dialectic which acted as "a strategy for individua-
tion," "as a constructive procedure, an enrichment and socializa-
tion of individuality"? If the present crisis of this "metaphysics of 
development," this "partisan thinking of civilization," is positive, 
in that it allows us to denounce all the theological presuppositions 
on which this thinking was established, must it necessarily entail 
the withdrawal of the individual into his own emptiness? The 
individual quest for salvation, together with the corresponding 
loss of that which founded metaphysical subjectivity, appears as a 
flight into "a religion or a metaphysics which cannot be relied upon 
to fill an interior void" (echoing Spengler's diagnosis). To coun-
teract this state of affairs and the division of discourses into "a logic 
of force" and "a powerless and consoling rationality," it would be 
necessary to opt for a "weak," sobered dialectic, which is apt to 
translate "contradictions into opportunities for change." 
Besides two essays by M. Vegetti and B. de Giovanni which 
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reexamine, in an historically oriented fashion, one the notion of 
classicism (in the light of stoicism) and the other the thought of 
Vico (who, as the thinker of the origin and of its oblivion on behalf 
of the useful, proves to be an important link for understanding "all 
civilization of the twentieth century"), it is necessary to mention 
two quite different, though both unclassifiable, texts : one by G . 
Agamben and the other by E. Severino. The first is a meditation on 
"the concept of language": "Is there a possible discourse which, 
without being a metalanguage and without falling into the unsay-
able, says language while exposing its limits . . . ?" The task of 
philosophy today is to confront this question which theology, 
ontology and psychology can no longer answer. To see language 
itself-that is, language as "immediate mediation" - could send 
us beyond all presuppositions to the "ahypothetical beginning" of 
which Plato speaks in the Republic. Weakening and enfeebling of 
the philosophical question, which, in this way, sees itself taken 
back to its essential and original poverty- such would be the path 
of a thinking in quest of the blind task which allows all vision, all 
speech, and is the foundation of all community. 
The second text, the one by E. Severino, presents itself as an 
original meditation which attempts to go back beyond "the original 
separation between being and beings as the essence of time" 
toward the eternal unity of which Parmenides, "the most misun-
derstood thinker in the history of man," would have had a presen-
timent. The original separation of being and beings, of being and 
appearance, is the origin of alienation and nihilism (a true "fall in 
time") that thinkers such as Hegel, Heidegger or Habermas, along 
with all quests for salvation, only strengthen, thereby participating 
in the will of technical domination. 
From R. Pineri's useful historical account of Italian 
philosophers between 1940 and 1960, a work which recalls the 
great figures (B. Croce, N. Abbagnano, A. Banfi, E. Paci, L. 
Pareyson, P. Chiodi ... ), one must remember the tremendous 
labor and concern for dialogue displayed by these thinkers which 
allowed German Idealism as well as the phenomenology of Hus-
serl and the investigations of Heidegger to go on living. 
To conclude it is necessary to mention two particular 
phenomena pointed out by documentary articles. The first is 
the fecundity and longevity of the Marxist tradition (retraced by 
A. Tosel) which, from A. Labriola in the last century to P. Togliatti, 
A. Gramsci, L. Coletti and A. Negri, bears witness to a current of 
thought which, without giving up its practical concerns, retains its 
demand for critical thought. The second phenomenon (recounted 
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by R. Dadoun) is this curious "School of Lecce" which, though less 
famous than the Frankfurt School, shows that there is no 
privileged place for giving oneself to serious philosophical reflec-
tion. 
If one had to draw a lesson from this volume, it would be that 
freedom of thought is not that which is given reluctantly by the 
powers that be, but that which is opened up by the works of those 
who dare to invent it. 
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